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Constitutional Law-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-CONTINUED EROSION
OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT-Heffron v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981).
Professor Emerson, an influential first amendment scholar, has
stated that first amendment freedom is essential for four values:
(1) individual self-fulfillment, (2) advancement of knowledge and
discovery of truth; (3) participation in decision making by all
members of the society; and (4) achievement of a "more adaptable
and hence a more stable community."1 Constitutional protection of
freedom of speech is justified not only because of the values it
serves, but because speech serves these values in a nonviolent and
noncoercive way.2
The late Justice William 0. Douglas was a leader in the move-
ment to expand first amendment freedoms. He invoked the self-
fulfillment value in Griswold v. Connecticut" and expanded this
value in Doe v. Bolton.4 The importance of individual self-fulfill-
ment has been expounded on by Professor Laurence H. Tribe. Pro-
fessor Tribe formulates "the central question posed by the Consti-
tution's most majestic guarantee" in the following language:
[I]s the freedom of speech to be regarded only as a means to
some further end-like successful self-government, or social sta-
bility, or (somewhat less instrumentally) the discovery and dis-
semination of truth-or is freedom of speech in part also an end
in itself, an expression of the sort of society we wish to become
and the sort of persons we wish to be? No adequate conception of
so basic an element of our fundamental law, . . . can be devel-
oped in purely instrumental or "purposive" terms.5
The growing emphasis on the function of the first amendment in
protecting individual self-fulfillment reflects a concern with mod-
ern society's tendency to inhibit the growth of individual auton-
omy and personality. Because of this tendency, the expansion of
first amendment theory should be welcomed. In general, the War-
ren Court protected speech and expression, and therefore the value
1. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPREsSION 6-7 (1970).
2. See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
964, 990 (1978).
3. 381 U.S. 479, 482-84 (1965).
4. 410 U.S. 179 (1973), Justice Douglas declared in Doe that the first amendment was
designed to secure "the autonomous control over the development and expression of one's
intellect, interests, tastes, and personalities." Id. at 211 (Douglas, J., concurring).
5. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576 (1978).
1981] CASE NOTES
of self-fulfillment, to an unprecedented degree. These decisions,
however, appear to be based on a favorable attitude toward first
amendment values rather than on a well-developed theory of the
first amendment. As a result, the Warren Court's decisions contain
numerous ambiguities concerning when speech will be protected. 7
The Burger Court has apparently accepted the traditional values
underlying the first amendment, but has often failed to articulate
those values or has not taken them to their logical conclusion.8 The
recent Supreme Court decision in Heffron v. International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,' reflects the Burger Court's lack
of a coherent theory in analyzing first amendment issues. The pur-
6. See, e.g., Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968);
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
7. An example of this is Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg, the
Court modified the clear and present danger test which had served to except from protec-
tion conduct that would otherwise be covered by the first amendment. The test, as modified
by Brandenburg, is said to afford protection to a greater area of expression than most other
tests, but it is also criticized as being excessively vague. See Emerson, First Amendment
Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 436-37 (1980).
Ironically, the balancing standard that gives the least protection to first amendment
rights was enunciated by the Warren Court in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
In O'Brien, the Court held that the government restriction was valid if: (1) it was within the
constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthered an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; (3) the interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4)
the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms was no greater than is essen-
tial to the furtherance of that interest. Id. at 377.
8. On the Burger Court's acceptance of the traditional values, see, e.g., Cohen v. Califor-
nia, 403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971). An example of the Burger Court's unresponsiveness to the
call for development of the self-fulfillment value is the Court's treatment of the long-hair
cases. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
While not repudiating the preferred position of speech and expression supported by the
Warren Court, the Burger Court has frequently ignored it. See, e.g., California v. LaRue,
409 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1972), where the Court upheld ordinances prohibiting certain kinds of
entertainment in bars or nightclubs where liquor was served despite the Court's concession
that the conduct was not obscene and constituted expression within the purview of the first
amendment. See also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). In Lehman,
the Court upheld a regulation which allowed the sale of commercial advertising space in
rapid transit cars but prohibited the sale of that same space for political advertising. The
Court focused on whether the policy was arbitrary and capricious and concluded that the
city had reasonable legislative objectives betraying a preference for legislative judgment
over first amendment values. Id. at 303-04.
The Burger Court has failed to invoke the strict scrutiny standard when first amendment
interests were involved, see, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,
844-45 (1978); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); and they have often em-
ployed a form of balancing giving little protection to first amendment rights if expression is
only incidentally affected by a governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free
speech. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79-82 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
9. 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981).
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pose of this note is to explore the ramifications of the Heffron deci-
sion, particularly the Court's failure to apply the appropriate anal-
ysis in determining when conduct constituting speech is entitled to
constitutional protection.
Rule 6.05 of the Minnesota Agricultural Society, a public corpo-
ration which operates the annual state fair in Minnesota, provides
that sale or distribution of any merchandise, including printed or
written material, without a license, or from a licensed location on
the fairgrounds, shall be a misdemeanor. Although the rule does
not prevent organizational representatives from walking about the
fairgrounds and communicating face-to-face with fair patrons, 0 an
exhibitor must conduct any sales, distribution, or fund solicitation
operations from a rented booth. Booth spaces are rented in a non-
discriminatory fashion on a first-come, first-served basis. The rule
applies to all nonprofit, charitable, and commmercial enterprises."
One day prior to the opening of the 1977 Minnesota State Fair,
the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISK-
CON), an organization espousing the views of the Krishna religion,
and the head of one of ISKCON's temples, filed suit in Minnesota
state court against numerous state officials seeking a declaration
that Rule 6.05, on its face and as applied, violated their first
amendment rights."' ISKCON asserted that the rule suppressed
the practice of Sankirtan, a religious ritual which enjoins its mem-
bers to go into public places to distribute or sell religious literature
and to solicit donations for the support of the Krishna religion.
The trial court summarily upheld the constitutionality of Rule
6.05.13
10. Id. at 2561-62.
11. Id. at 2562. In a footnote to the opinion, the Court lists organizations representing
some of the charitable, religious, and other non-commercial organizations that rented booth
space at the 1978 Minnesota State Fair. These included the American Heart Association,
Abortion Rights Council of Minnesota, Christian Business Men's Association, Church of
Christ, Minnesota Foster Parents Association, and United States-China Peoples Friendship
Association. Id. at n.5.
12. 101 S. Ct. at 2562. The action was commenced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) and
MINN. STAT. § 555.01 (1978) for a judgment declaring that Rule 6.05 violates the first and
fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. ISKCON also asked the trial
court to enjoin the state officials from enforcing the rule against members of ISKCON prac-
ticing Sankirtan in public areas of the fairgrounds. International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 1980).
13. 299 N.W.2d at 82. The trial court relied on the reasoning in International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Evans, 440 F. Supp. 414 (SD Ohio 1977), finding the state's
interest in providing all fairgoers with adequate access to each other and a minimum of
congestion sufficient to sustain Rule 6.05's limitations as applied to ISKCON members. The
court ordered that they (ISKCON members) be "prohibited from distributing materials
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On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the rule unconstitutionally restricted the Krishnas' religious prac-
tice of Sankirtan."' The court discussed less restrictive means that
would adequately serve the state's interest in preventing disorder,
stating that the Agricultural Society could: (1) promulgate rules to
specifically prohibit conduct that tends to create disorder-after
the fact prosecution rather than a prior restraint on conduct; (2)
limit the number of persons distributing and selling throughout
the public areas; or (3) devise a place regulation less restrictive
than Rule 6.05.15 The state's justifications for Rule 6.05 were thus
held inadequate to warrant the restrictions placed upon the mem-
bers of ISKCON. The state then petitioned for certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court granted "certiorari in light of
the important constitutional issues presented and the conflicting
results reached in similar cases in various lower courts." 16 The
Court pointed out that the issue was not whether the oral and
written dissemination of the Krishnas' views and doctrines was
protected by the first amendment, but rather whether Rule 6.05
was a permissible restriction on the place and manner of communi-
cating those views.17 The Court noted that the appropriate stan-
dard required for a valid time, place, and manner restriction is
that the restriction: (1) not be based on the content or subject
matter of the speech; (2) not be subject to arbitrary application;
such as books, flowers, flags, incense, or artifacts and from engaging in sales or solicitation
for monetary donations throughout the fairgrounds except from a booth rented from the
Society." 101 S. Ct. at 2563, n.8. They were permitted, however, to "roam throughout those
areas of the fairgrounds generally open to the public for the purpose of discussing with
others their religious beliefs." Id. at 2563.
14. 299 N.W.2d at 81. It is important to note that the Minnesota Supreme Court rested
its decision on the constitutional right to free exercise of religion, id., although they continu-
ally speak throughout the opinion of "[flirst [a]mendment rights." Id. at 83. This is some-
what confusing since freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion are both first
amendment rights.
15. Id. at 84.
16. 101 S. Ct. at 2563 (footnote omitted). In a footnote to the opinion the Court lists six
cases either invalidating or upholding a "booth" rule similar to Minnesota's and five other
cases which raised related issues concerning religious groups' access to other types of public
facilities, including airports, highway rest stops, a performing arts center, and the World
Trade Center. Id. at n.9. For a listing of some of these related cases in state and lower
federal courts, see United States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 870 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
17. 101 S. Ct. at 2563. The Court emphasized that it has often approved restrictions on
first amendment activities as to reasonable time, place, and manner. Id. See, e.g., Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966); Cox
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). It is not refuted in Heffron that each of the activi-
ties restricted (distribution of literature, sale of literature, and solicitation of funds) is an
expression of free speech and, therefore, constitutionally protected. 101 S. Ct. at 2563.
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(3) serve a significant governmental interest; and (4) allow for al-
ternative forums for the particular form of expression. The Court
first concluded that Rule 6.05 was neither content based nor sub-
ject to arbitrary application and thus the rule did not violate either
of the first two criteria.18
The Court then addressed whether the restriction served a sig-
nificant governmental interest. This governmental interest "must
be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the
particular forum involved."1 9 After evaluating this issue, the Court
concluded that the state's asserted interest in crowd control was
viewed too narrowly by the Minnesota Supreme Court.20 Justice
White, writing for the majority,21 stated that ISKCON had "no
special claim to [f]irst [a]mendment protection""2 and that the jus-
tification for the rule should be measured by the disorder that
would result if all other religious, nonreligious, and noncommercial
organizations could move freely about the fairgrounds distributing
and selling literature and soliciting funds.23 The Court found that
the alternative means suggested by the Minnesota Supreme Court
would not deal adequately with the problems posed by the much
larger number of distributors that would be present if members of
all organizations could move freely about.2" The Court thus held
18. 101 S. Ct. at 2564-65. Although ISKCON argued that the rule was content based in
that it preferred "listener-initiated" exchanges to those commenced by the speaker, the
Court recognized that Rule 6.05 applied to all potential exhibitors alike and that the argu-
ment had "little force." Id. at 2564, n.12.
Rule 6.05 is not open to arbitrary application. It does not permit punishment for the
expression of an unpopular point of view and is not open to subjective or discriminatory
enforcement. Id. at 2564-65. But cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971)
(Court held unconstitutional an ordinance punishing sidewalk assembly of three or more
persons conducting themselves in a manner annoying to those passing by); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 552 (1965) (breach of the peace ordinance was construed to punish for merely
espousing an unpopular view).
19. 101 S. Ct. at 2565. See also note 56 infra and accompanying text. See, e.g., United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court found that the government had
a compelling interest in insuring that each draft registrant had a draft card in his possession
and this was sufficient to justify a draft statute which forbid destroying a draft card. Id. at
377. See also note 7 supra.
20. 101 S. Ct. at 2566.
21. Justice White is joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Powell, and Rehnquist.
22. 101 S. Ct. at 2566.
23. Id. at 2567. It should be noted that ISKCON emphasized in its brief and oral argu-
ment to the Court that it was willing to rest its challenge wholly upon their general right to
free speech. Nevertheless, the majority in Hetfron chose to discuss Sankirtan, and hence the
free exercise clause in a manner seemingly inconsistent with prior case law. Id. at 2569-70,
n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24. Id. at 2566-67.
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that the state had a significant governmental interest in crowd
control that warranted a place or manner restriction.2 5
Finally, the Court discussed the requirement that alternative fo-
rums exist for the particular form of expression. Justice White
stated that Rule 6.05 was "not vulnerable on this ground."2 " In
support of this conclusion, Justice White stated that the rule: (1)
did not prevent Sankirtan anywhere outside the fairgrounds; (2)
did not deny ISKCON members access to the fairgrounds; and (3)
did not deny the right to conduct any desired activity at some
point within the forum .21 Accordingly, the validity of Rule 6.05 was
upheld.
In Heffron, the Court has again failed to carry its analysis to a
logical conclusion. By not analyzing the validity of Rule 6.05 as it
applies to each of the activities restricted, the majority failed to
recognize that some of the state's asserted interests may be reason-
able as applied to each of these activities (distribution of litera-
ture, sale of literature, and solicitation of funds) while others may
not. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens,
concurring and dissenting in part in a separate opinion, joined the
Court's judgment insofar as it upheld the rule's restrictions on
sales and solicitations,2 8 but maintained that Rule 6.05 was invalid
as applied to distribution of literature because "the [s]tate could
have drafted a more narrowly-drawn restriction on the right to dis-
tribute literature without undermining its interest in maintaining
crowd control. '29
In support of his conclusion, Justice Brennan relied on language
used in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
25. Id. at 2567, The state had also asserted interests in the rule as an antifraud measure
and as a means to protect the fairgoers from harassment. The Court declined to reach the
issues of whether these two purposes were constitutionally sufficient to support Rule 6.05
because of their holding that the rule was justified solely in terms of the state's interest in
crowd control. Id. at 2565, n.13.
26. Id. at 2567.
27. Id. The Court's opinion rejected the claim that Rule 6.05 effects a total ban on first
amendment activities since the booths are within the area of the fair where visitors are
expected and encouraged to pass. Id. at 2568, n.16.
28. Id. at 2569.
29. Id. at 2572. Justice Blackmun, writing for himself, also concurred and dissented in
part. He found the rule to be unconstitutional as applied to the distribution of literature for
the reasons stated by Justice Brennan. He agreed it was constitutional as applied to the sale
of literature and solicitation of funds, but reached the latter conclusion by a different analy-
sis. Where Justice Brennan would uphold the rule as applied to sales and solicitation as an
antifraud measure, Blackmun agreed with the majority's conclusion that Rule 6.05 is justi-
fied because of the state's interest in crowd control. Id. at 2572-73 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
1981]
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ment.30 In Schaumburg, the Court stated:
[a state] may serve its legitimate interests, but it must do so by
narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests
without unnecessarily interfering with [f]irst [ajmendment free-
doms .... (citations omitted) "Broad prophylactic rules in the
area of free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must
be the touchstone. ",s
Applying this language to the present case, Justice Brennan found
that Rule 6.05 was not narrowly drawn to advance the state's inter-
ests, and therefore placed a significant restriction on ISKCON
members' ability to exercise their first amendment rights.3 2 Justice
Brennan thus affirmed that part of the Minnesota Supreme
Court's opinion that struck down Rule 6.05 as it applied to the
distribution of literature."3
The Schaumburg rationale is illustrative of the Supreme Court's
continuing search for the types of restrictions that may be legiti-
mately imposed upon protected first amendment activities.3 4 The
Court has often held that activities protected by the first amend-
ment are subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
if the regulation serves a legitimate state interest and is narrowly
drawn.3 As early as 1941, the Court in Cox v. New Hampshire3 6
upheld a licensing requirement for parades through city streets,
finding that the state had authority to control the use of its public
streets and therefore the authority to control the time, place, and
manner of parades and processions.17 Similarly in 1972, in
30. 444 U.S. 620, rehearing denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980). Schaumburg dealt with an ordi-
nance which required charitable organizations to obtain a permit to solicit door-to-door.
The ordinance required that an organization applying for a permit show that 75% of the
proceeds would be directly used for the organization's charitable purposes. The Court
agreed with the court of appeals that the ordinance was overbroad and, therefore, violative
of the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 636. For a discussion of the Schaumburg
decision, see 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 185 (1981). See also Marshall, Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment and Religious Solicitation: Freedom of Speech and
Freedom of Religion Converge, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 953 (1980).
31. 444 U.S. at 637, quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (citations
omitted).
32. 101 S. Ct. at 2572.
33. Id. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
34. For other examples, see Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1976);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 275 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). See
also note 17 supra and accompanying text.
35. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
36. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
37. Id. at 576.
CASE NOTES
Grayned v. Rockford,88 the Court upheld an ordinance which pro-
hibited deliberately noisy or diversionary activity which would dis-
rupt normal school activities, finding that the ordinance was nar-
rowly tailored to further Rockford's compelling interest in having
its school environments conducive to learning.8 '
On the other hand, the Court has often struck down regulations
which were not narrowly drawn. For example, in Lovell v. City of
Griffin40 the Court declared an ordinance which prohibited distri-
bution of literature of any kind without first obtaining written per-
mission to be facially invalid because it was "not limited to ways
which might be regarded as inconsistent" with the state's asserted
interest.41 Similarly, in Shelton v. Tucker,'41 the Court invalidated
a statute which required public school teachers to annually disclose
their organizational ties. The Court pointed out that a state's pur-
pose, however legitimate and substantial, "cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved." More recently, the Court
held in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission" that a PSC regulation was unconstitutional because
it suppressed speech which in no way impaired the state's
interest.45
Justice Brennan's assertion in Heffron that Rule 6.05 was not
narrowly drawn to advance the state's interests is consistent with
these prior decisions concerning time, place, and manner restric-
tions. Whereas the ordinance in Grayned was specifically tailored
to restrict noise which would disrupt the school session, the regula-
tion in Heffron is similar to the ordinance struck down in Lovell in
that Rule 6.05 is not limited to ways which might necessarily be
regarded as inconsistent with the maintenance of crowd control. As
suggested by the Minnesota Supreme Court"' and reiterated by
38. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
39. Id. at 119. Cf. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (a 5-4 decision of the
Warren Court affirming the trespassing convictions of 32 Florida A & M students who
claimed a first amendment right to peacefully protest on a jailhouse lawn); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980) (invalidating an order of the
Public Service Commission prohibiting the inclusion of inserts in monthly utility bills which
discussed controversial issues of public policy).
40. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
41. Id. at 451.
42. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
43. Id. at 488.
44. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
45. Id. at 570.
46. 299 N.W.2d at 84.
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Justice Brennan, a legitimate interest in avoiding crowd disorder
could be served by a carefully drawn statute which would either
allow for the distribution of literature in some open areas of the
fairgrounds where traffic patterns could handle that activity, or
limit the number of persons distributing literature in the open
areas.
47
Rule 6.05 also fails to meet the correct standard for a permissi-
ble time, place, and manner restriction, as articulated in prior case
law, because the regulation, as applied to the distribution of litera-
ture, was not shown to further the asserted state interest. In Hef-
fron there was no evidence in the record to support the majority's
finding that crowd control problems would be more significant if
distribution of literature was not confined to a booth.48 As Justice
Brennan noted, the state had instead relied on a general, specula-
tive fear of disorder which is insufficient to overcome the right to
free expression.49 Both Justice Brennan and Justice Blackmun as-
serted that allowing distribution of literature was unlikely to cause
greater crowd control problems than already existed with the oral
proselytizing that was allowed under the rule.50
A finding in Heifron that Rule 6.05, as it applied to the distribu-
tion of literature, was not shown to further the state's asserted in-
terest would have been consistent with the analysis which the
Court recently applied in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim.5 1
In Schad, decided three weeks prior to Heffron, the Court invali-
dated, on first amendment grounds, the convictions of the opera-
tors of an adult bookstore who had been penalized under a zoning
47. 101 S. Ct. at 2571.
48. Id. at 2570-71.
49. Id. at 2571. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the Court stated:
Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given only to be so cir-
cumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact. Freedom of expression would
not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent
government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots. The Constitution says
that Congress (and the [s]tates) may not abridge the right to free speech.
Id. at 513.
50. 101 S. Ct. at 2570-73. Two recent circuit court decisions factually analogous to the
instant case held rules similar to Rule 6.05 unconstitutional on the basis that the record
failed to reflect evidence that serious disruption would result if the rules were invalidated.
See Edwards v. Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Soc'y, Inc., 628 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir.
1980) and International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667, 670
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979). A similar finding in Heffron would be sup-
ported by three affidavits contained in the record. 101 S. Ct. at 2571, n.5.
51. 101 S. Ct. 2176 (1981).
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ordinance prohibiting all live entertainment.2 The Court found no
evidence to support Mount Ephraim's asserted claim that live en-
tertainment in the borough would cause additional problems with
parking, trash, police protection, and medical facilities.53 Because
Mount Ephraim failed to establish that its interests could not be
met by restrictions that were less intrusive on the protected forms
of expression, the regulation was held unconstitutional.5 In Hef-
fron, the Court failed to hold the state to the burden of establish-
ing that its interest in crowd control could not be met by restric-
tions less intrusive than Rule 6.05, as it specifically applied to the
distribution of literature. Thus, the Court did not require Rule
6.05 to meet the standard employed in Schad for a time, place, or
manner restriction.
A third shortcoming of the Heffron decision is its failure to ade-
quately analyze the compatibility of distributing literature in the
open areas of the fairgrounds with the normal activity that takes
place on a fairground. In Grayned the Court stated that when de-
termining whether a regulation is permitted to further significant
governmental interests "[t]he crucial question is whether the man-
ner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity
of a particular place at a particular time."5 5 In Hefjron, Justice
White reiterated this same analysis by stating that the interest
"must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function
of the particular forum involved,"56 but then failed to adequately
assess the characteristic nature of the fair. The Minnesota State
Fair attracts large crowds who are free to roam about, give
speeches, engage in face-to-face advocacy, campaign, or prosely-
tize. 57 In general, it is a public forum for the communication of
ideas and information. At this type of forum, where the fair offi-
cials themselves were distributing literature" and the atmosphere
52. Id. at 2186. The Court cited the following language from Grayned: "Our cases make
clear that in assessing the reasonableness of a regulation, we must weigh heavily the fact
that communication is involved; the regulation must be narrowly tailored to further the
[s]tate's legitimate interest." Id. (citing 408 U.S. at 116-117) (footnotes omitted).
53. 101 S. Ct. at 2185.
54. Id. at 2186-87.
55. 408 U.S. at 116. Cf. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968) (Court upheld a
statute prohibiting picketing in a manner that would interfere with free access to any court-
house); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562, 565 (1965) (Court indicated that, because of the
special nature of the place, persons could be constitutionally prohibited from picketing in or
near a courthouse with the intent of interfering or obstructing the administration of justice.)
56. 101 S. Ct. at 2565.
57. Id. at 2569 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. Id. at 2571, n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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is conducive to spontaneous and often disorderly communication
of ideas, distribution of literature in the open areas of the fair-
grounds is compatible with the normal activity of the fair. To re-
strict the distribution of literature to a rented booth is an overly
intrusive means of achieving the state's interest in crowd control
and inconsistent with the analysis enunciated in Grayned and by
Justice White in Heffron.5 9
CONCLUSION
The Heffron decision is illustrative of the Supreme Court's con-
tinuing search for a just balance between time, place, and manner
restrictions that may legitimately be imposed upon activities pro-
tected by the first amendment. Any restriction of first amendment
activities must be narrowly tailored. In Heffron, the Court has
failed to scrutinize each of the activities in issue and to assess the
reasonableness of Rule 6.05 as it specifically applied to the distri-
bution of literature. A valid time, place, and manner restriction
must be shown to serve a substantial governmental interest and be
narrowly tailored in such a way so as to infringe upon the pro-
tected form of speech in the least intrusive manner possible. The
record in Heffron does not show that the crowd control problems
asserted by the state would be increased if Rule 6.05 allowed dis-
tribution of literature in the open areas of the fairgrounds. Fur-
thermore, the state did not establish that its interest could not
have been met by a restriction less intrusive on the activity of
literature distribution. Absent this evidence in the record, the
holding in Heffron is inconsistent with the analysis of time, place,
and manner restrictions that may legitimately be imposed on pro-
tected forms of expression.
JAME L. WALLACE
59. This conclusion is supported by the lack of evidence in the record to support a find-
ing that, absent the rule, crowd control problems would be increased. See note 50 supra and
accompanying text.
